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Abstract—We introduce a variation of coded computation that
ensures data security and master’s privacy against workers,
which is referred to as private secure coded computation. In
private secure coded computation, the master needs to compute a
function of its own dataset and one of the datasets in a library ex-
clusively shared by external workers. After recovering the desired
function, the workers must not be able to know which dataset in
the library was desired by the master or obtain any information
about the master’s own data. We propose a private secure coded
computation scheme for matrix multiplication, namely private
secure polynomial codes, based on private polynomial codes for
private coded computation. In simulations, we show that the
private secure polynomial codes achieves better computation time
than private polynomial codes modified for private secure coded
computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a distributed computing system where a master partitions
a massive computation into smaller sub-computations and dis-
tributes these sub-computations to several workers in order to
reduce the runtime to complete the whole computation, some
slow workers can be bottleneck of the process. These slow
workers are called stragglers, and mitigating the effect of these
stragglers is one of the major issues in distributed computing.
Recently, a coding technique was introduced for straggler
mitigation [1]. In [1], for a matrix-vector multiplication, the
matrix is (n, k)-MDS coded and distributed to n workers so
that each encoded matrix is assigned to one worker. Each
worker multiplies the coded submatrix by a vector and returns
the multiplication to the master. After k out of n workers
return their multiplications, the master can recover the whole
computation. Since the computation of the slowest n − k
workers is ignored, at most n− k stragglers can be mitigated.
This kind of approach to distributed computing is referred
to as coded computation. Several follow-up studies of coded
computation were proposed [2] - [4].
In this paper, we introduce a variation of coded computation
that considers both master’s privacy and data security against
the workers, which is referred to as private secure coded com-
putation. In the private secure coded computation, the master
requires distributed computing on a function f of its own
data A and specific data BD included in a library B, which
is exclusively shared by external workers. For each worker,
the master encodes A with an encoding function gD
A
, sends
encoded data to the worker, and requests the worker to encode
B with an encoding function gD
B
and compute a function
fW(g
D
A
(A), gD
B
(B)). After the master recovers the result of
desired function f(A,BD) from the computation results of
fW returned by the workers, the workers should not be able
to identify that BD is desired by the master, which would
imply that the master’s privacy is protected. The workers also
should not obtain any information about the master’s data A,
which would imply that the data security is guaranteed. Private
secure coded computation will be explained in further detail
in Section II.
As a motivating example of the private secure coded com-
putation, we may consider a user who employs an artificial
intelligence (AI) assistant, e.g. Google Assistant or Siri, with
its mobile. We assume that the user can request a recommen-
dation from an AI assistant of an item which is included in
one of M categories that the AI assistant can recommend,
e.g. movies, games, restaurants, and so on. We refer to the
M categories as a library B and denote them by {Bk}
M
k=1
such that B = {Bk}
M
k=1. We also assume that the user
stores its preference parameter A. When the user requests
a recommendation from the AI assistant of an item in a
category BD, the assistant encodes A and sends encoded data
to several distributed workers, e.g. data centers, for recovering
f(A,BD) in a distributed way. After recovery, the AI assistant
can decide the recommended item based on f(A,BD). We
assume that the AI assistant does not share the user preference
parameter A with workers and that the user can delete the
recommendation service usage record right after the item is
recommended so that the AI assistant does not identify the
user’s recommendation service usage pattern.
In this example, the data security of A against the workers
is ensured by encrypting A while encoding it. However,
encrypting A cannot protect the user’s privacy. Generally, the
user uses this recommendation service according to its life
cycle. That is, if the workers track the recommendation service
usage records, the user’s life cycle is revealed to them, which
implies that the user’s privacy has been compromised. We
remark that this privacy invasion on the user’s life cycle is
related to B, not A. Therefore, encrypting A cannot protect
the user’s privacy on the life cycle. In order to protect the
user’s privacy, the workers should not know that a particular
BD is desired by a user, which motivates the private secure
coded computation.
Data security in coded computation was studied in previous
works [5] - [7]. In these works, the master has both of two
matrices A and BD whereas the workers do not have any
library. The master wants to compute a matrix multiplication
ABD using the workers. Since the workers do not have their
own library, the master’s privacy against the workers is not
considered in this system model. The master’s privacy in
coded computation was considered in [8] first, and the coded
computation model that considers the master’s privacy was
referred to as private coded computation. In [8], an achievable
scheme for private coded computation based on polynomial
codes [9] was proposed, which was referred to as private
polynomial codes.
In this paper, we propose a private secure coded compu-
tation scheme for matrix multiplication, based on polynomial
codes. We refer to this scheme as private secure polynomial
codes. For the data security, the master jointly encode A and
a random matrix R into polynomial codes where the random
matrix R is exclusively owned by the master and concealed
to the workers, which was previously proposed in [5]. The
idea for protecting the master’s privacy is based on private
polynomial codes in [8]. In simulation results, we show that
the private secure polynomial codes achieve faster computation
time than private polynomial codes modified for private secure
coded computation.
Notation : We use [N ] to denote a set comprised of N
elements, 1 to N . A set comprised of M elements, N + 1 to
N +M is denoted by [N + 1 : N +M ].
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe a system model of private secure
coded computation. There is a master who has its own dataset
A, where A is an element (matrix) in a vector space V1 over
a field F. There are also N external workers {Wi}
N
i=1, and
these workers share a library B which consists of M different
datasets {Bk}
M
k=1. Each dataset Bk is an element (matrix) in
a vector space V2 over the same field F. The master needs
distributed computing on a function f of A and one of M
datasets {Bk}
M
k=1 in library B, where f : (V1,V2) → V3
for a vector space V3 over the same field F. We denote the
desired dataset by BD. Therefore, the whole computation
desired by the master is denoted by f(A,BD). Since we
consider private coded computation for matrix multiplication,
f(A,BD) = ABD in this paper.
The whole computation is converted into several sub-
computations and assigned to the workers. Each worker returns
its sub-computation result to the master. When sufficient num-
ber of sub-computation results are returned to the master, the
master can recover the whole computation f(A,BD) based on
the received sub-computation results. We denote the minimum
number of sub-computation results to recover f(A,BD) by K
which was referred to as recovery threshold in [9]. The slowest
N − K workers become stragglers, since they do not return
their sub-computations results. After the master recovers the
whole computation, each worker should not be able to obtain
any information about A or identify that BD is desired by
the master, thus ensuring data security and master’s privacy.
In this paper, we assume that the workers do not collude with
each other so that each worker does not know which sub-
computations are assigned to, computed by, and returned by
the other workers.
The master’s own dataset A and the library B are encoded
for the private secure coded computation. Note that the mas-
ter’s own dataset A is encoded by the master whereas the
library B is encoded by each worker. The master encodes
A for each worker Wi. We denote the encoding function
of A for the worker Wi and desired matrix BD by g
D
A,Wi
,
where gD
A,Wi
: V1 → U1 for a vector space U1 over the
same field F. The master sends the encoded data gD
A,Wi
(A) to
the worker Wi and also sends the queries for requesting Wi
to encode the library B. We denote the encoding function
of the worker Wi for the library B = {Bk}
M
k=1 and the
desired dataset BD by g
D
B,Wi
, where gD
B,Wi
: VM2 → U2 for
a vector space U2 over the same field F. The master also
sends the queries to the worker Wi to compute a function of
gD
A,Wi
(A) and gD
B,Wi
(B) and return the computation result of
the function to the master. That is, the worker Wi computes
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)). We denote the function of Wi by
fDWi : (U1,U2) → U3 for a vector space U3 over the same
field F. Without considering where the sub-computation result
comes from, we denote the ith sub-computation result returned
to the master by Si, where Si is an element in the vector
space U3. After K sub-computation results {Si}
K
i=1 across the
N workers are returned to the master, the master can recover
the whole computation f(A,BD) by decoding {Si}
K
i=1. If we
denote the decoding function at the master by dD : U
K
3 → V3,
the decoding function dD should satisfy the constraint given
by dD(S1, S2, · · · , SK) = f(A,BD).
The master’s privacy is protected when none of the workers
can identify indexD of the desired datasetBD after the master
recovers the whole computation. Since the privacy we consider
is information-theoretic privacy, the privacy constraint for each
worker Wi can be expressed as
I(D;QDi , g
D
A,Wi(A), f
D
Wi
(gDA,Wi(A), g
D
B,Wi(B)),B) = 0,
where QDi denotes the queries that the master sends to
the worker Wi for encoding g
D
B,Wi
(B) and computing
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)).
For a simpler expression, we denote gD
A,Wi
(A) and
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)) by CDi and R
D
i , respectively, so
that the privacy constraint becomes
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0. (1)
Similarly, the data security constraint for each worker Wi
can be expressed as
I(A;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0.. (2)
The overall process of the private secure coded computation
is depicted in Fig. 1.
III. PRIVATE SECURE POLYNOMIAL CODES
In this section, we propose private secure polynomial codes
for matrix multiplication. We describe the scheme with an
illustrative example and generally describe the private secure
Fig. 1. The overall process of private secure coded computation.
polynomial codes. We also prove that the master’s privacy and
data security are protected.
A. Illustrative Example
We assume that the master has a matrix A ∈ Fr×sq for
sufficiently large finite field Fq and that there are 12 non-
colluding workers {Wn}
12
n=1 where each worker has a library
of two matrices B1,B2 ∈ F
s×t
q . As in Section II, we denote
the library by B. Let us assume that the master wants to
compute AB1 using {Wn}
12
n=1 while hiding that the master
desires B1 from the workers. The matrix A can be partitioned
into two submatrices A0,A1 ∈ F
r/2×s
q so that A=
[
A0
A1
]
and each of B1,B2 are partitioned into two submatrices
Bk,1,Bk,2 ∈ F
s×t/2
q , k ∈ [2] , so that Bk=
[
Bk,1 Bk,2
]
.
Therefore, AB1 =
[
A0B1,1 A0B1,2
A1B1,1 A1B1,2
]
. The private secure
polynomial codes for A, B1 and B2 are as follows.
A˜(x) = A0 +A1x+Rx
2, B˜k(x) = Bk,1x
3 +Bk,2x
6,
where k ∈ [2], R ∈ F
r/2×s
q denotes a random matrix, and
x ∈ Fq denotes the variable of polynomials A˜ and B˜k.
We denote the evaluations of A˜ and B˜k at x = xi by
A˜(xi) and B˜k(xi) , respectively. For the desired matrix B1
and each worker Wi, the master evaluates A˜ at a randomly
chosen point xi and sends the evaluation A˜(xi) to the worker
Wi. That is, g
1
A,Wi
(A) = A˜(xi). We assume that the points
{xi}
12
i=1 are distinct from each other. The master also sends
the queries Q1i that request Wi to encode the library B
with an encoding function g1
B,Wi
and compute a function
f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi
(A), g1
B,Wi
(B)).
The libraryB is encoded as follows. Firstly, for each worker
Wi, B˜1 is evaluated at xi. Secondly, for all of the workers,
the undesired matrix B˜2 is evaluated at a randomly chosen
point x13 which is distinct from the points {xi}
12
i=1. Since the
workers do not collude with each other, they cannot notice
that B˜2 is evaluated at an identical point x13 across workers.
Finally, for each worker Wi, the encoded library is given by
g1
B,Wi
(B) = B˜1(xi) + B˜2(x13).
After encoding the library, each worker Wi computes
a function f1Wi(g
1
A,Wi
(A), g1
B,Wi
(B)) = A˜(xi)(B˜1(xi) +
B˜2(x13)) which is given by
A˜(xi)(B˜1(xi) + B˜2(x13))
= (A0 +A1xi +Rx
2
i )×
(B1,1x
3
i +B1,2x
6
i +B2,1x
3
13 +B2,2x
6
13)
=
8∑
l=0
Zlx
l
i,
where {Zl}
8
l=0 are given by
Zl = Al(B2,1x
3
13 +B2,2x
6
13) ∀l ∈ [0 : 1],
Zl = Al−3B1,1 ∀l ∈ [3 : 4],
Zl = Al−6B1,2 ∀l ∈ [6 : 7],
Z2 = R(B2,1x
3
13 +B2,2x
6
13),Z5 = RB1,1,Z8 = RB1,2.
Since the degree of polynomial A˜(x)(B˜1(x) + B˜2(x13))
is 8 and the evaluating points {xi}
12
i=1 are distinct from each
other, the master can decode the polynomial from the sub-
computation results returned by the 9 fastest workers, by
polynomial interpolation. We denote the decoding function
by dD and sub-computation result returned from the ith
fastest worker by Si. The master can decode the polyno-
mial A˜(x)(B˜1(x) + B˜2(x13)) from {Si}
9
i=1, so that the
coefficients {Zl}
8
l=0 are obtained. Note that the term Z0 =
A0B2,1x
3
13+A0B2,2x
6
13 and Z1 = A1B2,1x
3
13+A1B2,2x
6
13
are constant terms in each polynomial, respectively. The whole
computation AB1 =
[
A0B1,1 A0B1,2
A1B1,1 A1B1,2
]
can be recovered
from the coefficients of x3,x4,x6,x7. Therefore, the recovery
threshold K equals 9 and dD(S1, S2, · · · , S9) = AB1.
B. General Description
In this section, we generally describe the private secure
polynomial codes for matrix multiplication. There are N non-
colluding workers {Wn}
N
n=1 and each worker has a library
B of M matrices {Bk}
M
k=1 where each Bk ∈ F
s×t
q for
sufficiently large finite field Fq. The master has a matrix
A ∈ Fr×sq and desires to multiply A by one of {Bk}
M
k=1
in the library B while keeping the index of desired matrix
BD and content of A from all of the workers. Matrix A
can be partitioned into m submatrices {Ak}
m−1
k=0 ∈ F
r/m×s
q
and each Bk can be partitioned into n − 1 submatrices
{Bk,l}
n−1
l=1 ∈ F
s×t/(n−1)
q , where m,n ∈ N+. The whole
computation ABD that the master wants to recover is given
by
ABD =


A0BD,1 A0BD,2 · · · A0BD,n−1
A1BD,1 A1BD,2 · · · A1BD,n−1
...
... · · ·
...
Am−1BD,1 Am−1BD,2 · · · Am−1BD,n−1

 .
The polynomial codes for A and {Bk}
M
k=1 are given as
follows.
A˜(x) =
m−1∑
l=0
Alx
l +Rxm, B˜k(x) =
n−1∑
l=1
Bk,lx
l(m+1),
where k ∈ [M ], R ∈ F
r/m×s
q denotes a random matrix, and
x ∈ Fq denotes the variable of polynomials A˜ and B˜k.
We denote the evaluations of A˜ and B˜k at x = xi by
A˜(xi) and B˜k(xi), respectively. For the desired matrix BD
and each worker Wi, the master evaluates A˜ at a randomly
chosen point xi and sends the evaluation A˜(xi) to the worker
Wi. That is, g
D
A,Wi
(A) = A˜(xi). We assume that the points
{xi}
N
i=1 are distinct from each other. The master also sends
the queries QDi that request Wi to encode the library B
with an encoding function gD
B,Wi
and compute a function
fDWi(g
D
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)).
The libraryB is encoded as follows. Firstly, for each worker
Wi, B˜D is evaluated at xi. Secondly, for all of the workers
and the undesired matrices {B˜k|k ∈ [M ]\D}, each undesired
matrix B˜k is evaluated at a randomly chosen point xjk which
is distinct from the points {xi}
N
i=1. Since the workers do not
collude with each other, they cannot notice that each B˜k is
evaluated at an identical point xjk across workers. Finally, for
each worker Wi, the encoded library is given by g
D
B,Wi
(B) =
B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ).
After encoding the library, each worker Wi computes
a function fDWi(g
D
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)) = A˜(xi)(B˜D(xi) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk )) which is given by
A˜(xi)(B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
B˜k(xjk))
= A˜(xi)B˜D(xi) + A˜(xi)
∑
k∈[M ]\D
B˜k(xjk)
=
m−1∑
l=0
n−1∑
p=1
AlBD,px
l+p(m+1) +
n−1∑
p=1
RBD,px
pm+m+p
+
m−1∑
l=0
∑
k∈[M ]\D
AlB˜k(xjk )x
l +
∑
k∈[M ]\D
RB˜k(xjk )x
m
=
n(m+1)−1∑
l=0
Zlx
l,
where {Zl}
n(m+1)−1
l=0 are given by
Zl =
∑
k∈[M ]\D
AlB˜k(xjk ) ∀l ∈ [0 : m− 1],
Zl =
∑
k∈[M ]\D
RB˜k(xjk) ∀l = m,
Zl = RBD,l ∀l = m+ p(m+ 1), p ∈ [1 : n− 1],
Zl = Al−p(m+1)BD,p ∀l ∈ [p(m+ 1) : p(m+ 1) +m− 1],
p ∈ [1 : n− 1].
Since the degree of polynomial A˜(xi)(B˜D(xi) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk )) is mn + n − 1 and the evaluating
points {xi}
N
i=1 are distinct from each other, the master can
decode the polynomial from the sub-computation results
returned by the mn + n fastest workers, by polynomial
interpolation. We denote the decoding function by dD
and sub-computation result returned from the ith fastest
worker by Si. The master can decode the polynomial
A˜(xi)(B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk )) from {Si}
mn+n
i=1 , so
that the coefficients {Zl}
mn+n−1
l=0 are obtained. The whole
computation ABD can be recovered from the coefficients
{Zl|l ∈ [p(m + 1) : p(m + 1) + m − 1], p ∈ [1 : n − 1]}.
Therefore, the recovery threshold K equals mn + n and
dD(S1, S2, · · · , Smn+n) = ABD.
Remark 1. In the private polynomial codes in [8], the master’s
own data A and the library B are encoded into separate
polynomials. That is, A˜ is polynomial of x whereas {B˜k}
M
k=1
are polynomials of y. Since the random matrix R is not
considered in the private polynomial codes, A and B should
not be encoded with same variable x for protecting the
master’s privacy. If A and B are encoded with same variable
x without R, the workers obtain non-zero information about
A˜(xi). That is, the workers may identify that A is encoded
with xi. Since the desired matrix BD is also encoded with xi,
the workers thereby realize that BD is desired by the master,
thus implying that the master’s privacy is violated. Therefore,
compared to the private polynomial codes in [8], our private
secure polynomial codes have a notable difference.
C. Privacy and Security Proof
To prove that the data security and the master’s privacy are
protected in the private secure polynomial codes, we need to
show that the privacy constraint in (1) and the data security
constraint in (2) are satisfied for every worker. The basic idea
for proof is similar to that in [8]. The details of the proof will
be given in Appendix.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, in terms of the computation time consumed
for receiving K sub-computation results across N workers,
we compare the private secure polynomial codes and private
polynomial codes modified for private secure coded compu-
tation. In private polynomial codes, the data security can be
protected by adding R when encoding A, which is same as
private secure polynomial codes. Nevertheless, as explained
in Remark 1, since the library B is encoded with distinct
variable y, the workers are still divided into groups in private
polynomial codes. Grouping may increase the computation
time since the computation time is determined by the slowest
group.
We assume that the computation time distribution of each
worker is independent of each other and follows the exponen-
tial distribution as in [1]. In [1], the computation time is given
by
tconv =
1
K
(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N −K
), (3)
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Fig. 2. The computation time comparison between the private secure polyno-
mial code and private polynomial code for N = 12, M = 4, µ = γ = 0.1,
and varying K .
where µ and γ are the straggling parameter and the shift
parameter, respectively.
Compared to (3), in private secure polynomial codes, the
recovery threshold K equals to n(m+1) and n/(n−1) times
more computation than directly computing ABD is required.
Therefore, the computation time of private secure polynomial
code is given by
tps =
1
(m+ 1)(n− 1)
(γ +
1
µ
log
N
N − n(m+ 1)
). (4)
The computation time of private polynomial codes is given by
(9) in [8].
We compare the computation time between three schemes
for N = 12, M = 4, and γ = µ = 0.1. We set n = 2, which
implies that the workers are divided into 2 groups in private
polynomial codes. For fair comparison, we assume that each
worker returns only one sub-computation result to the master
in private polynomial codes, as in private secure polynomial
codes. Since K = n(m+ 1) in the private secure polynomial
codes and private polynomial codes, we set K as even number
and vary K from 4 to 10. That is, m is varying from 1
to 4. The comparison result for computation time is given
in Fig. 2. Compared to the private polynomial codes, private
secure polynomial codes achieves at most 25% reduction in
computation time, thus implying that our proposed scheme
outperforms the previous works when considering both of data
security and master’s privacy.
We also compare the computation time for given
N,M,K, γ and varying µ. We set N = 12, M = 4, K = 4,
γ = 1 and vary µ from 10−1 to 10. As seen in Fig. 3,
the private secure polynomial codes outperforms the private
polynomial codes, whereas the gap between the two schemes
decrease as µ becomes larger. This is because the effect of
stragglers are diminished when µ becomes larger.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced private secure coded computa-
tion as a variation of coded computation that ensures data secu-
rity and master’s privacy at the same time. As an achievable
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Fig. 3. The computation time comparison between the private secure
polynomial code and private polynomial code for N = 12, M = 4, K = 4,
γ = 1, and varying µ.
scheme for private secure coded computation, we proposed
private secure polynomial codes based on private polynomial
codes in private coded computation. In simulations, we com-
pared private secure polynomial codes with private polynomial
codes in terms of computation time, and showed that the
proposed scheme outperforms the existing scheme. In future
work, we will further analyze the performance of private
secure polynomial codes and compare the performance in
practical scenarios, e.g., AWS or Google Cloud.
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VI. APPENDIX
In this appendix, we prove that the private secure polyno-
mial codes ensure both of the data security and the master’s
privacy. In other words, we show that the data security
constraint in (1) and the privacy constraint in (2) are satisfied
for every worker.
For the master’s privacy, we need to show that the privacy
constraint for each worker Wi is satisfied, which was given
by (1). By chain rule, we can write the privacy constraint as
follows.
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B)
= I(D;QDi )
+ I(D;B|QDi )
+ I(D;CDi |Q
D
i ,B)
+ I(D;RDi |Q
D
i ,B, C
D
i )
Note that RDi = f
D
Wi
(gD
A,Wi
(A), gD
B,Wi
(B)) is a de-
terministic function of CDi = g
D
A,Wi
(A) and gD
B,Wi
(B),
where gD
B,Wi
(B) is a function of B. Since gD
B,Wi
(B) =
B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ) and the evaluating points xi
and {xjk |k ∈ [M ] \ D} are determined by the the queries
QDi , g
D
B,Wi
(B) is a deterministic function of QDi , which
implies that RDi is a deterministic function of C
D
i , B, and
QDi . Therefore, I(D;R
D
i |Q
D
i ,B, C
D
i ) = 0. Since C
D
i =
A˜(xi) =
∑m−1
l=0 Alx
l
i, C
D
i is independent of D. Therefore,
I(D;CDi |Q
D
i ,B) = 0. Since the master determines the index
of the desired matrix D without knowing any information of
the library B, the library B is independent of D, which is
followed by I(D;B|QDi ) = 0.
For the desired matrix BD , the master sends queries Q
D
i to
each worker Wi in order to request Wi to encode the library B
into B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ) and compute the function
A˜(xi)(B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk )). The queries Q
D
i are
fourfold:
1) QDi,p : queries for partitioning each matrix Bk in the
library B into n− 1 submatrices {Bk,l}
n−1
l=1
2) QDi,e : queries for evaluating B˜D and {B˜k|k ∈ [M ]\D}
at the points xi and {xjk |k ∈ [M ] \D}, respectively
3) QDi,s : queries for summing the evaluations of {B˜k}
M
k=1
into one equation B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk)
4) QDi,c : queries for computing the function
According to QDi,p, all submatrices {Bk,l}
(M,n−1)
(k,l)=(1,1) are
elements in F
s×t/(n−1)
q . Therefore, QDi,p are independent of
D, which implies I(D;QDi,p) = 0.
According to QDi,e, as assumed in Section III-B, the points
xi and {xjk |k ∈ [M ] \ D} are distinct from each other and
randomly chosen in Fq . Therefore, Q
D
i,e are independent of D,
which implies I(D;QDi,e) = 0.
According to QDi,s, all of the evaluations of {B˜k}
M
k=1
are symmetrically summed into one equation B˜D(xi) +∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ). Therefore, Q
D
i,s are independent of D,
which implies I(D;QDi,s) = 0.
According to QDi,c, C
D
i = A˜(xi) is multiplied by
B˜D(xi)+
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ). We already explained that C
D
i
and B˜D(xi) +
∑
k∈[M ]\D B˜k(xjk ) are independent of D.
Therefore, QDi,c are also independent of D, which implies
I(D;QDi,c) = 0.
As a result, I(D;QDi ) = 0, which implies that
I(D;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) = 0. Since the privacy constraint is
satisfied for every worker, the master’s privacy is considered
to be protected in private polynomial codes. 
For the data security, we need to show that the data security
constraint given in (2). By the chain rule, we can write the data
security constraint as follows.
I(A;QDi , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B)
= I(A;QDi )
+ I(A;B|QDi )
+ I(A;CDi |Q
D
i ,B)
+ I(A;RDi |Q
D
i ,B, C
D
i )
As explained, RDi is a deterministic function of C
D
i , B,
and QDi . Therefore, I(A;R
D
i |Q
D
i ,B, C
D
i ) = 0. Since C
D
i =
Alx
l
i + Rx
m
i and R is a random matrix, I(A;C
D
i |Q
D
i ,B).
Since A and B are independent, I(A;B|QDi ) = 0. Since Q
D
i
are queries for encodingB,QDi are independent ofA, thus im-
plying that I(A;QDi ). As a result, I(A;Q
D
i , C
D
i , R
D
i ,B) =
0. Since the security constraint is satisfied for every worker,
the data security is ensured in private secure polynomial codes.

